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The Charging Order: Conflicts Between
Partners And Creditors
J. Dennis Hynes*
INTRODUCTION
The charging order provides a means by which an unpaid personal
creditor of a partner can attach and, under some circumstances, sell the
debtor's partnership interest.' Two recent California cases, Centurion
Corp. v. Crocker National Bank2 and Hellman v. Anderson,3 have created
doubts about full use of this process by increasing the restrictions on
foreclosure and sale of a partnership interest. 4 The cases are significant
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. I wish to acknowledge the always helpful
and insightful comments of my colleague Professor Cliff Calhoun, and the valuable contribution of my research
assistant Scott Renner.
1. UNIp. PARTNERsHip Acr § 28, 6 U.L.A. 358 (1969). Section 28 reads in full as follows:
(1) On due application to a competent court by any judgment creditor of a partner, the court which
entered the judgment, order, or decree, or any other court, may charge the interest of the debtor
partner with payment of the unsatisfied amount of such judgment debt with interest thereon; and may
then or later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits, and of any other money due or to fall due
to him in respect of the partnership, and make all other orders, directions, accounts, and inquiries
which the debtor partner might have made, or which the circumstances of the case may require.
(2) The interest charged may be redeemed at any time before foreclosure, or in case of a sale being
directed by the court may be purchased without thereby causing dissolution:
(a) With separate property, by one or more of the partners, or
(b) With partnership property, by any one or more of the partners with the consent of all the
partners whose interests are not so charged or sold.
(3) Nothing in this act shall be held to deprive a partner of his right, if any, under the exemption
laws, as regards his interest in the partnership.
2. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1, 255 Cal. Rptr. 794 (Ist Dist. 1989).
3. 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830 (3d Dist. 1991).
4. The Hellman case in the Third District disagrees with the Crocker case from the First District, and
proposes a different test. See infra notes 59 & 67-77 and accompanying text (evaluating the Hellman decision);
infra notes 78-94 and accompanying text (discussing the Hellman test). This conflict between districts creates
a situation ripe for appeal to the California Supreme Court whenever the issue is next raised in California. See
Centurion Corp. v. CrockerNat'l Bank, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9,255 Cal. Rptr. 794,798 (1st Dist. 1989) (creating
a consent limitation on charging orders); Hellman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830,
837 (3d Dist. 1991) (creating an undue interference limitation on charging orders).
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because they raise new and intriguing issues concerning charging orders.
They were the subject of a thorough and careful student Comment in this
Journal,' which supported Hellman v. Anderson,6 the most recent of the
two decisions. This Article argues that both cases add unnecessary
uncertainty to the law and treat too lightly the legitimate interests of
unpaid personal creditors, overlooking protections already provided to
nondebtor partners by statute.7
Part I of this Article describes the charging order, its history, and the
problem of foreclosure and sale.8 Part II sets forth and evaluates the
consent limitation imposed by the California court in the Crocker case.9
Part I[I discusses and evaluates the undue interference limitation imposed
by the Hellman court, and concludes that both the consent and the undue
interference limitations add unnecessary burdens and complexity to the
law.'0
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Charging Order
The charging order remedy for unpaid personal creditors is contained
in section 28 of the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA). It allows a
5. Andrew Ian Sriro, California Charging Orders: Court Ordered Foreclosures Of Charged Partnership
Interests, 24 PAC. LJ. 181 (1992). Mr. Sriro's article thoroughly describes the background of the charging order
and the cases raising the issues to be discussed in this article. Id at 185-99. Some of the background material
and case descriptions will again be covered here in the interest of not requiring the reader to read two articles
in order to understand one. Nevertheless, no effort is made to duplicate Mr. Sriro's full treatment of this subject.
6. 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1991).
7. See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (describing the protections provided to nondebtor
partners). In that respect, this paper disagrees with Mr. Sriro's analysis, which approves of the undue interference
test created by the most recent of the two California cases, Hellman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 284
Cal. Rptr. 830 (3d Dist. 1991). There is much to be said for the arguments advanced by Mr. Sriro and the
Hellman court, as will be developed later in this article. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. This paper
seeks only to add an argument or two and to suggest a contrary conclusion in recognition of the excessive cost
to creditors of adopting the restrictions imposed by the two cases discussed in this Article, particularly when
balanced against the protections already granted by the charging order process to the partnership and the
nondebtor partners.
8. See infra notes 11-37 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 38-66 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 67-114 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 1 (providing the full text of § 28 of UPA). The UPA has been adopted in all states
except Louisiana. 6 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1992); see CAL CORP. CODE §§ 15001-15045 (West 1991) (codifying UPA
in California). The UPA was substantially revised by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws [hereinafter NCCUSL] and adopted as a new uniform act in 1992. UNiF. PARThBRSHIP ACT 6 U.L.A.
214-46 (Supp. 1993); see infra notes 112-114 and accompanying text (commenting on § 504 of the 1992
Uniform Partnership Act, which is the counterpart provision to § 28 of UPA).
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judgment creditor to apply to a court for an order charging the interest12
of the debtor partner with payment of the unsatisfied amount of the
judgment.13 The order applies to the debtor's share of profits and to "any
other money due or to fall due to him in respect of the partnership." 14
The statute also provides, somewhat indirectly, for foreclosure and sale of
a partner's interest.15 It is that part of the statute, dealing with foreclosure
and sale, that is the focus of this Article.
B. The History of the Charging Order
The charging order is an important part of a sophisticated statutory
scheme designed to protect the interests of personal creditors and the
partnership business.1 6 At common law, the enforcement of judgments by
personal creditors of a partner against the assets the debtor had in a
partnership presented serious difficulties for the other partners. Execution
of judgments at common law reached only tangible assets. 17 Courts at
common law conceptualized the property rights of partners as joint
ownership of the partnership assets."' Thus, creditors of partners were
entitled to execute against specific assets owned by the partnership. This
disrupted the partnership business and operated to the disadvantage of the
nondebtor partners.19 Equity intervened to protect the nondebtor
12. See UNit. PARTNERSHip Acr § 26, 6 U.L.A. 349 (1969) (defining the interest of a partner as "his
share of the profits and surplus, and the same in personal property.").
13. UNio. PARTNERSHw Acr § 28, 6 U.L.A. 358 (1969); see supra note I (quoting the text of § 28).
14. Id. at § 28(1).
15. Id at § 28(2).
16. The charging order was first provided by statute in § 23(2) of the English Partnership Act, which was
promulgated in 1890. 53-54 Vict. c. 39 (1890).
17. 1 ALAN R. BROMBERO & LARRY E. RiBsTE N oN PARTNERSHIP § 3:63 (1991).
18. Id.
19. A famous statement by Lord Justice Lindley of the English Court of Appeal summarized the problem:
When a creditor obtained a judgment against one partner and he wanted to obtain the benefit of that
judgment against the share of that partnr in the firm, the first thing to issue was afi. fa., and the
sheriff went down to the partnership place of business, seized everything, stopped the business, drove
the solvent partners wild, and caused the execution creditor to bring an action in Chancery in order
to get an injunction to take an account and pay over that which was due by the execution debtor. A
more clumsy method of proceeding could hardly have grown up.
Brown, Janson & Co. v. Hutchinson & Co., 1 Q.B. 737, 738-39 (1895).
The phrasefi.fa. is an abbreviation of the Latin wordsfierifacias, translated roughly as, "Means that you
cause (it) to be done." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 627 (6th ed. 1990). It was the common law writ of execution
of a judgment, commanding the sheriff to levy upon the goods of the judgment debtor. Id. As mentioned above,
the common law writs permitted seizure of physical property only. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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partners,20 but the overall process was confused and drawn out.2' The
charging order is an imaginative solution to this problem. It allows a
creditor to reach a partner's interest in the partnership2 2 without
disrupting the operation of the business ,23 at least if foreclosure is not
part of the relief granted by a court.
C. The Problem of Foreclosure and Sale
Ordinarily a charging order functions to provide payment of a
judgment out of the income distributed by a profit generating business.24
The charging order creditor receives the debtor partner's share and applies
it to the judgment.' Assuming that the judgment is not too large in
relation to the income flow to the partners, it is paid off in a reasonable
amount of time. The judgment is discharged and the debtor partner
20. Equity recognized the nondebtor partner's right to apply partnership property to partnership purposes,
which included the discharge of partnership liabilities, and gave priority to this right against the rights of
creditors of an individual partner. BIOtmmEO & RmSTEIN, supra note 17, at 3:64.
21. Id. at 3:63 (stating that "[n]o partnership property question was more confused at common law than
the right of a partner's separate creditor to attach or levy execution on the partner's interest in the firm's
property").
22. See UNiF. PARTNERSHI ACT § 26, 6 U.L.A. 349 (1969) (defining the interest of a partner as "his
share of the profits and surplus.. ."). The interest of a partner thus does not include a specific share of each item
of partnership property.
The UPA defines the property rights of a partner as: "(1) his rights in specific partnership property, (2) his
interest in the partnership, and (3) his right to participate in the management" UNiF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 24,
6 U.L.A. 324 (1969); see id at § 25(1), 6 U.L.A. at 326 (defining a partner's "rights in specific partnership
property" as, a "co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership.");
id. at § 25(2)(a), 6 U.L.A. at 326 (noting that the incidents of this tenancy include "an equal right with his
partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes; but he has no right to possess such
property for any other purpose without the consent of his partners."); id. at § 25(2)(b), 6 U.L.A. at 326 (stating
that, "[a] partner's right in specific partnership property is not assignable except in connection with the
assignment of rights of all the partners in the same property").
It is clear from UPA § 25 that a partner's ownership interest in specific partnership property is very limited,
consisting largely of a joint right of possession for partnership purposes. In all other significant respects the
property is owned by the partnership, in reality. Section 25 is drafted in the way it is due to the decision to base
UPA on the aggregate theory and at the same time resolve some of the uncertainties concerning partnership
property that existed at common law. BROMBERG & RIasmiN, supra note 17, at 1:23-1:25.
23. It is the partner's interest (an intangible) which is charged, not his property rights. A partner's
property rights include a right to participate in management. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 24, U.L.A. 324 (1969).
Additionally, personal use and enjoyment of partnership property are denied without the consent of copartners.
Id at § 25, 6 U.L.A. at 325-26; see supra note 22 (discussing §§ 24 and 25 of UPA). Thus management rights
are not affected when a charging order is issued, nor is the partnership's use and enjoyment of specific
partnership property interfered with in any way.
24. The charging order also can reach any other distribution made by the partnership to the debtor partner,
such as withdrawal of capital, if the wording of the order so provides. BROMBERO & RIBSTEIN, supra note 17,
at 3:72.
25. See J. Gordon Gose, The Charging Order Under The Uniform Partnership Act, 28 WASH. L. REv.
1, 10-11 (1953) (discussing the charging order).
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resumes receiving income and other distributions from the partnership.26
Sometimes, however, the income flow from the business is small or
nonexistent. This can easily be imagined with a partnership that holds
vacant land for investment. No matter how valuable the land may be, there
is no income to apply to the debt. Under that circumstance the charging
order, standing alone, is of no practical value to the judgment creditor.27
It is at this point that the remedy provided by section 28(2) of UPA
becomes important to the creditor.
As noted briefly above, section 28 can be read to provide a remedy of
foreclosure and sale to a creditor of an individual partner.28 Section 28(2)
deals primarily with the redemption rights of the nondebtor partners but
also contains language stating that, "[t]he interest charged may be
redeemed at any time before foreclosure, or in case of a sale being directed
by the court ... ,29Nearly all the cases construing section 28(2) have
held that this language contemplates foreclosure and sale of the debtor
partner's interest,30 a conclusion which seems inescapable considering the
text of the statute. Unfortunately, that is all the statute says, which leaves
a fair amount open to interpretation.
26. d at 16.
27. It does, however, establish a lien priority for the creditor. See Union Colony Bank v. United Bank
of Greeley, 832 P.2d 1112 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
28. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
29. UNIt. PARTNERsHip Acr § 28,6 U.L.A. 358 (1969); see supra note I (providing the full text of UPA
§ 28).
30. See Bohonus v. Amerco, 602 P.2d 469, 470 (Ariz. 1979); Centurion Corp. v. Crocker Natl Bank,
208 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8, 255 Cal. Rptr. 794, 798 (1st Dist. 1989); Helman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840,
847, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 834-35 (3d Dist. 1991); First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. District Court, 652 P.2d 613,
617 (Colo. 1982); Wills v. Wills, 750 S.W.2d 567, 574 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Tupper v. Kroc, 494 P.2d 1275,
1278-79 (Nev. 1972); FDIC v. Birchwood Builders, 573 A.2d 182, 185 (NJ. Super. 1990); Beckley v. Speaks,
240 N.Y.S.2d 553, 557 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1963) (concluding that UPA § 28 allows for the foreclosure and sale of
the partner's interest). But see Buckman v. Goldblatt, 314 N.E.2d 188, 191 n.7 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (rejecting
the remedy of foreclosure and sale). The Buckman court interpreted the word "foreclosure" in § 28 as referring
to foreclosure in support of a judgment against the partnership only, stating that this interpretation was necessary
in order to avoid "irreconcilable conflict" with UPA § 25(2)(c), which states that a partner's right in specific
partnership property is not subject to attachment or execution except on a claim against the partnership. Id at
191. This confuses the distinction between a partner's interest in the partnership and a partner's interest in
specific partnership property. See supra note 12 (defining partnership interests); supra note 22 (defining a
partner's interest in specific partnership property). It should be emphasized that the case itself involved an effort
by a personal creditor to attach specific partnership property. The court rightly rejected that claim. Buckman, 314
N.E.2d at 190. The language concerning § 28 clearly was dictum, contained in a footnote to the opinion
addressing the charging order as the remedy the creditor should have chosen. Id. Foreclosure and sale is denied
by statute in Georgia. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-28(b) (1989); see also infra notes 107-109 and accompanying
text (citing Professor Ribstein's analysis of the Georgia Statute).
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Serious consequences result from foreclosure and sale of a partner's
interest, although the purchaser does not acquire managerial powers, rights
against specific partnership property, or become a partner.3 As stated in
one of the classic cases on the charging order, Tupper v. Kroc,32 "when
[the debtor partner's] interest in the partnerships was sold he was forever
foreclosed from receiving any profits or surplus .... ,3 Also, at the sale,
the purchaser acquires the power to dissolve the partnership under certain
circumstances.34 The power to dissolve the partnership is also given
collectively to the nondebtor partners, even if the partnership is for a
term.35 Because of these consequences, it is well settled that a creditor
cannot receive foreclosure on demand. Courts that have addressed the issue
have held that the trial court has discretion to order a sale only if it is
necessary in order to realize payment of the judgment within a reasonable
time.36
The restriction that the power of foreclosure and sale is not available
unless the judgment otherwise would not be paid within a reasonable time
makes sense in light of the seriousness of a forced sale of a partnership
31. See supra note 22 (explaining that § 24 includes managerial powers among the property rights of a
partner). These powers are not sold when a partner's interest is sold. The drafters of UPA were careful to avoid
the problem of the other partners having a stranger with managerial powers thrust upon them. The status of a
purchaser of a partner's interest upon foreclosure is that of an assignee (by operation of law) of a partner's
interest. 2 BROMmERO & RIBsTEiN, supra note 17, at 7:70 n.59. An assignee is not entitled to interfere in the
management of the partnership, nor to demand any information about partnership business transactions or inspect
partnership books. UNiF. PARTERSHIP Acr § 27, 6 U.LA. 353 (1969).
32. 494 P.2d 1275 (Nev. 1972).
33. Tupper v. Kroc, 494 P.2d 1275, 1278 n.2 (Nev. 1972).
34. UNiw. PARTNE sm' Acr § 32(2), 6 U.LA. 394 (1969) (stating that, "loin the application of the
purchaser of a partner's interest under § .. . 28 [the court shall decree a dissolution] (a) After the termination
of the specified term or particular undertaking, (b) At any time if the partnership was a partnership at will...
when the charging order was issued").
35. Id. at § 31, 6 U.L.A. at 376 (defining the causes of dissolution). UPA § 31 states that, "[d]issolution
is caused: (1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners .... (c) By the express will of all the
partners who have not assigned their interests or suffered them to be charged for their separate debts, either
before or after the termination of any specified term or particular undertaking." lt
36. This limitation is most clearly expressed in FDIC v. Birchwood Builders, Inc., 573 A.2d 182, 186
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), where the court stated that:
mhe trial court should be circumspect in its decision to order a sale. If the court is convinced the
creditor's claim will not be satisfied in a reasonably expedient manner by diverting the debtor's
income from the partnership to satisfy the debt, then sale should be ordered. Otherwise, the sale
should not be ordered so as to preclude the edverse effect such a sale may have on a solvent
partnership. In the latter instance, the debtor partner has the burden of proving that the debt can be
satisfied by other than sale since that partner is better able than the creditor to project the income
status of the partnership and the prospects of its future success, if any.
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interest. As noted earlier, two recent California cases have created
additional restrictions, the consent limitation and the undue interference
limitation,37 as developed immediately below.
II. THE CROCKER CASE AND THE LIMITATION OF CONSENT
A. The Consent Limitation
The case of Centurion Corp. v. Crocker National Bank38 involved an
appeal from a trial court order mandating the sale of a limited partner' S39
partnership interest.' Respondent Crocker National Bank had earlier been
granted a judgment for over $1,400,000 against Perroton and shortly
thereafter obtained an order charging Perroton's interest in a limited
partnership known as Turn-Key Storage.4' Ten months went by and the
charging order produced no money.42 Crocker moved for a foreclosure
sale of Perroton's interest, apparently concluding that there was no
reasonable prospect for payment of the judgment through routine
distribution of partnership earnings.43 Notice was served both on Perroton,
the sole limited partner, and on his mother, the sole general partner of
Turn-Key Storage. 44 Perroton's mother filed a statement of conditional
non-opposition to the sale.45 Crocker's motion was granted by the trial
court.4 6
37. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
38. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1, 255 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1st Dist. 1989). The Crocker case is cited as Crocker Nat'l
Bank v. Perroton in Hellman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830 (3d Dist. 1991).
39. Because a limited partnership is involved, one must first look to limited partnership legislation. See
CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 15611-15723 (West 1991) (adopting the RULPA in 1983). See REV. UNIF. LTD.
PARTNERsHIP Acr § 703, 6 U.L.A. 442 (Supp. 1993) (providing the charging order remedy to creditors of
limited partners). RULPA § 703 is derived from § 22 of the original Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Id., 6
U.L.A. at 443. Curiously, neither § 22 of ULPA nor § 703 of RULPA contain language authorizing foreclosure
and sale. The absence of such language did not concern the court in the Crocker case. See also REV. UNW. LTD.
PARTNERsHE' AcT § 703 cmt. 3, 6 U.L.A. 442 cmt. 3 (Supp. 1992) (suggesting indirectly that the rules available
to creditors of general partners will determine matters not covered in the terse § 703). This can be read to
include the remedy of foreclosure and sale.
40. Crocker, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 3-4, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795-96.
41. Id. at 3-4, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
42. Id. at 4, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
Perroton subsequently filed a motion to void the order of sale, arguing
that it was inconsistent with the terms of the limited partnership agreement,
which prohibited assignment of his interest.47 The court denied the
motion and Perroton appealed.48 The appellate court rejected Perroton's
argument, citing to and quoting from Tupper v. Kroc,49 a case directly on
point.50 The Crocker court concluded that California law "seem[s] to
contemplate" sale of a partnership interest "where three conditions are met:
first, the creditor has previously obtained a charging order; second, the
judgment nevertheless remains unsatisfied; and third, all partners other than
the debtor have consented to the sale of the interest."5'
The Crocker court does not explain its requirement that nondebtor
partners must consent to the sale. That issue was not litigated because the
only other partner in the partnership, Perroton's mother, had consented.52
The court seems to base its three conditions upon language from an earlier
case, Taylor v. S & M Lamp Company.53 The court in Taylor had stated
that the charging order provision was "not intended to protect a debtor
partner against claims of his judgment creditors where no legitimate
interest of the partnership, or of the remaining or former partners is to be
served."'  It is this general language upon which the Crocker court
appears to rely.55 The Taylor case did not itself set forth conditions of
sale. Instead, it dealt with a situation where an interest had been sold
without an order from a trial court directing the sale, a procedural flaw
unrelated to the circumstance of the Crocker case.
47. Id. at 9, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
48. Id. at 4, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
49. 494 P.2d 1275 (1972).
50. Crocker, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 10, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 799 (citing Tupper v. Kroc, 494 P.2d 1275
(1972)). The Tupper court held that, "Mhe partnership agreements could not divest the district court of its
powers provided by statute to charge and sell an interest of a partner in a partnership." Tupper, 494 P.2d at
1280.
51. Crocker, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 9, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
52. Id. at 4, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
53. 190 Cal. App. 2d 700, 12 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1961), cited in Crocker, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 9, 255 Cal.
Rptr. at 798.
54. Taylor v. S & M Lamp Co., 190 Cal. App. 2d 700, 708, 12 Cal. Rptr. 323, 328 (1961).
55. The court in Crocker states that "[a]llowing sale in such instance is consistent with . . . the
observation of Taylor that [a sale is permissible] 'where no legitimate interest of the partnership, or of the
remaining or former partners is to be served."' Crocker, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 9, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 798-99.
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The court in Crocker apparently assumed it was in the "legitimate
interest" of the nondebtor partners to require their consent before a sale.56
Perhaps the reasoning underlying this was that a purchaser at the sale can
under certain circumstances obtain a court ordered dissolution of the
partnership, as noted above,57 and this constitutes a sufficient interference
with the partnership to justify requiring the consent of the partners. Or
perhaps the court was simply restating the factual situation in front of it,
without considering the implications of stating consent as a condition of
sale.
B. Evaluation of the Consent Requirement
The decision of the Crocker court to read the "legitimate interest"
language in Taylor as support for a requirement of consent of the
nondebtor partners is doubtful for several reasons. First, the statute itself
expressly provides for consent of all the other partners where partnership
property is being used to redeem the interest charged.58 Yet, the statute
does not require the consent of the other partners to the sale of the interest.
This undermines the argument that such a requirement is consistent with
the intent of the legislature. As stated subsequent to Crocker, in Hellman
v. Anderson,59 "plainly, if the Legislature wants to make partner consent
a condition, it knows how to do so." 60 Second, the interest of the
nondebtor partners in protecting themselves from foreclosure and sale is
expressly addressed in the redemption options granted them by the
statute.61 Also, the decision to impose the consent requirement is curious
56. Id.; see supra note 54 and accompanying text (quoting the "legitimate interest" language in the Taylor
opinion).
57. See supra note 34 (explaining how to obtain a court ordered dissolution of a partnership).
58. UNIF. PAR'tNEsnHI Acr § 28(2)(b), 6 U.L.A. 358 (1969); see supra note 1 (citing the full text of
UPA § 28).
59. 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830 (3d Dist. 1991); see infra notes 67-94 and accompanying
text (discussing the Hellman decision).
60. Hellman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 851,284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 837 (3d Dist. 1991). The court
in Hellman also quoted the following from People v. Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 1010, 741 P.2d 154, 157, 239
Cal. Rptr. 656, 660 (1987): "[When the drafters of a statute have employed a term in one place and omitted
it in another, it should not be inferred where it has been excluded." Hellman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 851, 284 Cal.
Rptr. at 837.
61. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (discussing the redemption options granted to nondebtor
partners).
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because the Taylor case involved a general partnership, where one could
at least argue that the managerial powers of the debtor partner may pose
a threat to the partnership after foreclosure 62 because the partner no
longer has an economic incentive to further the business.63 However, the
charged partner in Crocker was a limited partner, who probably had no
right to exercise control in the business and thus would not have
managerial powers.64
In addition to the above reservations, the requirement of consent of the
nondebtor partners introduces an arbitrary element into the charging order
process. The right of a creditor to reach the assets of the debtor partner is
seriously impaired if consent is required of people who are likely to be
hostile to the creditor's claim and thus may withhold their consent in an
arbitrary manner.65 The Crocker court in effect makes foreclosure and
sale of a partnership interest, unavailable to creditors, except in the rare
instance when all the other partners consent to the sale. It seems
unreasonable to assume that a legitimate interest of the partnership or the
remaining partners always is served by requiring consent of the other
partners. As the court in the Hellman case stated, the consent requirement
of the Crocker court is "inflexible." 66 Because of this, it is doubtful that
the limitation imposed by Crocker will find a permanent place in the law.
62. It is a curious feature of the foreclosure and sale process that the partner whose interest is sold
remains a partner of the finm, despite the lack of any economic interest in the firm. See supra notes 32-33 and
accompanying text (discussing Tupper v. Kroc, 494 P.2d 1275 (Nev. 1972)). The court in Tupper held that the
managerial powers of the sole general partner of a limited partnership were restored when the purchaser of the
general partner's interest at a foreclosure sale mistakenly asked that a receiver for the partnership be discharged.
Id. at 1280.
63. This argument assumes that the general language of Taylor includes a requirement of consent. The
assumption is made for the sake of argument only. Nothing in the language or the facts of Taylor gives a hint
of such a requirement. Also, the paradox that a partner can retain managerial powers without an economic stake
in the firm has not troubled courts, perhaps for the reason that the other partners have means to protect
themselves. See UNiF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 31(l)(c), 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969); supra note 35 (discussing UPA §
31(l)(c)).
64. Limited partners ordinarily do not exercise control in the business. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15632(a)
(West Supp. 1993) (adopting the 1985 amendments to RULPA § 303(a), which state that a limited partner is
not liable for any obligation of a limited partnership "unless... the limited partner participates in the control
of the business"). This liability is limited to creditors who rely on a belief, based upon the limited partner's
conduct, that the controlling limited partner is a general partner. Id. However, the risk of liability nevertheless
is sufficient to discourage many limited partners from exercising control. See Joseph J. Basile, Jr., Limited
Liability for Limited Partners: An Argument for the Abolition of the Control Rule, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1199,
1217-1218 (1985).
65. It is true that the only other partner consented to the sale in Crocker, the case may be unique because
of the special circumstance that Perroton's mother consented to the sale. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text (stating that Perroton's mother was the sole general partner of Turn-Key Storage).
66. Hellman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 838 (3d Dist. 1991).
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III. THE HELLMAN CASE AND ITS UNDUE INTERFERENCE TEST
A. The "Undue Interference" Limitation
Two years after the Crocker case was decided, the issue of foreclosure
and sale of a partner's interest came up again in California. This time the
issue of consent was directly litigated. In Hellman v. Anderson67 a
judgment of over $400,000 had been entered in favor of Hellman against
Anderson, a partner in a general partnership named RMI. 68 Hellman
thereafter obtained a charging order,69 but received no money.70 Six
months later, following a debtor's examination of Anderson in which
Anderson said that RMI had not generated profits and was not expected to
do so in the near future, Hellman filed a motion for a foreclosure sale of
Anderson's interest.7 The trial court granted the motion, accepting the
argument that the charging order would not satisfy the judgment within a
reasonable time and rejecting the Crocker case's consent requirement. 72
Tallstrom, Anderson's partner, appealed the order on the ground that he
did not consent to the sale and that consent was required by California
law.73 The appellate court held that foreclosure and sale of a partner's
interest in a partnership is proper even though the other partners do not
consent to the sale,74 "provided the foreclosure does not unduly interfere
with the partnership business. 75 The appellate court reversed and
remanded the case to the trial court because it had failed to conduct an
inquiry into the issue of undue interference.76
67. 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830 (3d Dist. 1991).
68. Id. at 843, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
69. JL
70. Id.
71. Id. at 844, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
72. Id. at 851, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
73. Id. at 844, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 832. Anderson also appealed, as did a second creditor. Id. Another
argument on appeal was that California Code of Civil Procedure § 699.720, which deals with the execution of
judgments, prohibited execution on the interest of a partner where the partnership is not a judgment debtor. Id.
at 848, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 835. The court in Hellman rejected this argument by pointing out that a writ of
execution was different from a court-ordered foreclosure sale. Id.
74. See supra notes 60 and 66 and accompanying text (explaining the Hellman court's reasons for
rejecting the consent requirement).
75. Hellman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 842, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
76. Id. at 853, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
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The Hellman court explained its decision by stating that:
[Tihe policy underlying the Uniform Partnership Act [is] avoiding
undue interference with partnership business .... In some cases,
foreclosure might cause a partner with essential managerial skills
to abandon the partnership. In other cases, foreclosure would
appear to have no appreciable effect on the conduct of partnership
business. Thus, the effect of foreclosure on the partnership should
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the trial court in
connection with its equitable power to order a foreclosure.77
B. Evaluation of the Undue Inteiference Limitation
The opinion of the court in Hellman handles a number of issues in a
careful and thoughtful manner. With regard to its imposition of the undue
interference requirement, the court invokes the history underlying the
charging order and notes that it was created in order to avoid disruption
of and interference with the partnership business. 78 The nondebtor
partners in a charging order setting have had a situation thrust upon them
which occurred outside of the course of partnership business and over
which they had no control. A restriction on foreclosure, framed in terms
of protecting the business from undue interference, seems sensible and
appealing. Nevertheless, the undue interference rule has several troubling
consequences.
One consequence of the Hellman rule is that it creates uncertainty in
the law by requiring litigation of the somewhat open-ended and vague
factual question of whether a sale will unduly interfere with the particular
partnership before the court. It is true that the factual issue of whether the
current income of the partnership is insufficient to pay the judgment within
a reasonable time will be before a court every time a creditor seeks
foreclosure and sale. However, that inquiry is strictly economic and is
fairly straightforward, whereas the inquiry required by Hellman invites the
77. Id. at 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838. Th appellate court remanded to the trial court for determination
of this issue. Id. at 853, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838. It placed the burden of proving undue interference on the
defendant debtor partner because knowledge about the effect of foreclosure on the partnership "is peculiarly
known to defendant in his capacity as partner... ." Id.
78. Id. at 845, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
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partners to make arguments about undue interference, with an unlimited
range of real or imagined difficulties available to them. The Hellman rule
encourages speculation by courts on the future impact on the business of
sale of a partner's interest. Furthermore, to the extent it introduces
uncertainty into the foreclosure remedy it undermines the threat of
foreclosure, reducing the incentive of the charged partner to enter into
whatever arrangements may be available to prevent it.
Uncertainty is a necessary byproduct whenever a rule sets a vague and
fact-specific standard. That alone does not make a rule wrong.7 9 However,
it is important to recognize that uncertainty comes at a cost. Under the
Hellman rule, a creditor will never know whether foreclosure is possible
until the factual issue of undue interference is litigated and resolved. Also,
parties will incur an additional expense in litigating this open-ended issue,
and valuable court time will be devoted to controversies about undue
interference. Strong reasons should be required for supporting such a rule.
With regard to the necessity for such a rule, the opinion in the Hellman
case overlooks protection the statute itself makes available to the
nondebtor partners. Section 28 of UPA grants the nondebtor partner
redemption rights80 which provide for payment of the charged interest
with separate property by one or more of the partners or with partnership
property by one or more of the partners with the consent of all the partners
79. Mr. Sriro also recognizes the uncertainty created by the undue interference rule, noting in his
concluding paragraph that "[tlhe Hellman court's broad holding has opened the door for further debate regarding
what undue interference actually means.. . ." See Sfiro, supra note 5, at 219. Mr. Sriro accepts this uncertainty,
calling the undue interference rule a "flexible standard" and part of achieving a "just result" in individual cases.
Id. at 214. He also argues that "[the optimal undue interference test should satisfy the interests of creditors, the
interests of society in promoting a stable economy, and the interests of the non-debtor partners." Id. at 216.
These are worthy goals. The drawback is the uncertainty created by attempting to achieve them through the
undue interference test. My concern focuses on the cost incurred in reaching those goals through a vague test
that does not take the redemption rights of nondebtor partners into account. See infra notes 80-87 and
accompanying text (discussing redemption rights).
80. See supra note I (providing the full text of UPA § 28).
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whose interests are not charged.81 Redemption can occur before
foreclosure or at the sale.82
The drafters of the statute doubtlessly assumed that redemption,
coupled with the carefully crafted limitations placed on the nature of the
interest bought at a sale,83  provides sufficient protection 84  for the
nondebtor partners. It gives them, or any one of them, the choice to
eliminate altogether the intrusion posed by the judgment creditor by buying
the interest being charged, together with a choice of ways to proceed.8 5
If redemption is not chosen, the purchaser at the sale cannot exercise
management rights and has no right to possess partnership property. 6 It is
true that the purchaser can obtain dissolution by decree of court, but this
can be requested immediately only if the partnership is one at will.8
Also, the statute provides the other partners broader rights 8 of
81. Id. The opinion in Hellman does not mention redemption rights when discussing its undue
interference limitation. See Helman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 852-54,284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 837-39 (3d
Dist. 1991). Also, Mr. Sriro does not discuss redemption rights in his text when addressing the undue
interference test. Sriro, supra note 5, at 211-19. He does raise redemption in a footnote, but only in the context
of the leverage a foreclosing creditor has against nondebtor partners. Id. at 213 n. 222. He notes at the beginning
of his discussion that "[t]he Hellman court's use of the term 'undue interference' appears to represent an attempt
to carry out the intention of the drafters of UPA to avoid the consequential injustices of the direct execution [at
common law] procedure." Id. at 211. Mr. Sriro's characterization of the intent of the Hellman court is
doubtlessly accurate. The difficulty is that the undue interference limitation cannot be justified convincingly
without first considering the redemption rights granted partners by UPA. Those rights are designed to address
the issue of interference with the partnership business. It seems odd for Hellman to create a rule of undue
interference without even considering language in the statute directed toward that same goal.
82. UNW. PARrNnmS- Acr § 28(2), 6 U.L.A. 358 (1969); see supra note I (providing the full text of
UPA § 28(2)).
83. See supra notes 12 and 22 (describing the limited nature of the interest that a purchaser buys at the
sale of a partnership interest). Managerial rights, even rights to information, are not included in the sale. See
UNI. PARTNERsHIP Acr § 27(1), 6 U.L.A. 353 (1969) (denying rights to information to an assignee); see also
supra note 31 (stating that the purchaser at foreclosure of a partner's interest is an assignee by operation of law).
84. There is a difference between "sufficient" protection and "perfect" protection, of course. The charging
order process necessarily involves a balancing of conflicting interests, with an inevitable cost to one or the other
interest.
85. This presumes that the other partners have the economic resources to exercise the choice the statute
gives them. Sometimes that will not be true. But, to the extent that it is not true, the importance of giving the
creditor access to the interest of its debtor is increased. That is, the lack of current economic resources available
to the partners makes payment of the debt by any means other than foreclosure even less likely.
86. See supra note 31 (stating that managerial rights are not transferred with the sale of the partnership
interest).
87. See supra note 34 (quoting the text of UPA § 32(2)).
88. The word "right" is used rather than "power" because the exercise of a right is privileged, incurring
no liability, contractual or otherwise, to other persons. WEsLEY NEwcoMu HoHom, Frm Aira.L LEaAL
CONCEI'iONs 36 (1919). Partners always have the power to dissolve the partnership, charging order or no
charging order. UNw. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 31, 6 U.L.A. 376 (1969). But they, or any one of them, ordinarily
do not have the contractual right to do so if the partnership has a term. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 17,
at 7:17.
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dissolution, since it extends their dissolution right to a term partnership
under these circumstances.8 9
The above protections loom particularly large when one considers that
the charging order displaces creditor remedies at common law.' That
places a heavy burden of explanation on one seeking to add a gloss to the
statute further restricting the rights of a judgment creditor to obtain
satisfaction. The example of an undue interference given by the court is a
deprivation of the managerial skills of the debtor.9 This example does
not seem sufficiently compelling to justify the vague undue interference
rule. Nothing prevents the other partners from paying the debtor partner
whose interest has been sold a salary to exercise managerial skills. 92 Also,
even in the absence of a sale, the economic incentive of the charged
partner to exercise managerial skills is weakened because all of the profits
and the surplus of the charged partner are going to the creditor,
underscoring the fact that this problem exists beyond the circumstance
addressed by the Hellman court.
It is undeniable that the nondebtor partners are inconvenienced by the
claims of a creditor of a fellow partner.93 The charging order comes at a
cost to the partnership and the nondebtor partners. The interest of the
unpaid creditor is substantial, however, particularly under the circumstance
89. See supra note 35 (stating the causes of dissolution).
90. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 17, at 3:70 (noting that courts generally have interpreted
UPA to say that a charging order is the exclusive process for a personal creditor of a partner). See also, UNiF.
PARTNsHi' Acr § 504(e), 6 U.L.A. 231 (Supp. 1993) (declaring that the charging order is the exclusive
remedy for judgment creditors of partners).
91. Hellman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 838 (3d Dist 1991).
92. It should be acknowledged that this would impose a cost on the other partners that they had not
suffered prior to the foreclosure and sale, since compensation ordinarily is not paid to a partner. See UNIF.
PART ERsHiP Acr § 18(0, 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969) (providing that no partner is entitled to remuneration for acting
in the partnership business absent agreement to the contrary). The assumption underlying § 18(f) doubtlessly
is that the economic incentive to act is provided by a share of profits and surplus.
93. In some respects the inconvenience is similar to that suffered by employers who have to respond to
garnishment orders: accounting burdens are incurred, risks of improper payment are run, changes of address have
to be kept track of, and so forth. With regard to garnishment, see Union Colony Bank v. United Bank, 832 P.2d
1112, 1116-17 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992), comparing the charging order to garnishment in Colorado, a typical
jurisdiction. See also J. Gordon Gose, The Charging Order Under the Unifonn Partnership Act, 28 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1953) (stating that: "Mhe act seems to proceed on the theory that the primary method for satisfying
the creditor's judgment shall be by means of an order diverting the debtor partner's share of the profits to his
creditor in a manner somewhat like that used in garnishment proceedings"). Of course, foreclosure and sale are
a step beyond the inconvenience of responding to garnishment of wages, but the fact remains that the realization
of creditor's rights can impose costs on others in settings besides the law of partnership.
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where a large portion of the debtor's assets are contained in the
partnership. It is important that unpaid creditors have access to all assets
of the debtor except those declared exempt by the state. 4 Inevitably the
conflicting interests of the nondebtor partners and the unpaid creditor must
be balanced. That is the goal of UPA section 28.
The case of FDIC v. Birchwood Builders95 stands as recent authority
against the approach of the Hellman case. In FDIC, the plaintiff obtained
a judgment against defendant Raganella, who had a 40 percent interest in
a partnership that owned a valuable tract of vacant land.' The plaintiff
sought an order charging Raganella's partnership interest with the
$385,000 judgment and ordering sale of the interest.97 The only evidence
before the trial court was that the partnership had no income and the tract
of land had an appraised value of $600,000.98 The trial court charged
Raganella's interest, but denied the plaintiffs request for sale of the
partnership interest.99 The court reasoned that a sale of Raganella's
interest would interfere with the development potential of the land and that
the charging order provided the plaintiff with adequate security.'0 The
94. This proposition can be justified on the moral grounds that debts should be paid as promised. It also
can be justified on the economic grounds that it increases the cost of credit for all borrowers, particularly high-
risk borrowers, if obstacles are placed in the way of collection of valid debts beyond the protection provided
by exemption laws. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE LJ. 131, 151 (1989)
(observing that placing increased risks on lenders does not come cost free to borrowers).
95. 573 A.2d 182 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
96. FDIC v. Birchwood Builders, Inc., 573 A.2d 182, 183 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
97. Id. Including interest, the judgment had grown to over $385,000. 1d
98. Id. at 186.
99. Id. at 183.
100. In this respect the approach of the trial court appears consistent with Hellman. See supra note 78 and
accompanying text (discussing the burden placed on the defendant by the Hellman court). One can argue that
it is an undue interference with the partnership business if sale of the debtor partner's interest takes place when
the land of the partnership is close to being developed and will soon greatly increase in value. Although this may
go beyond the facts of FDIC in the sense that there apparently was no prospect of immediate development in
that case, nevertheless, taking the facts as hypothesized, an argument against the trial court's conclusion is that
the prospect of immediate development both increases the incentive for the other partners to redeem and
enhances their prospects of obtaining financing in order to do so. Also, if they do not redeem, the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale buys only the debtor's interest, not a lien upon or right to sell the land owned by the
partnership. Unless the partnership is at will, the nondebtor partners can develop at their leisure, unthreatened
by dissolution rights of the purchaser. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the partnership would be classified as one
at will. An argument for an implied term until the development is complete would be strong. See Shannon v.
Hudson, 161 Cal. App. 2d, 325 P.2d 1022 (2d Dist. 1958) (holding that joint venture to construct, operate, and
sell motel was not terminable at will, reasoning that an implied term existed until partnership property could be
disposed of on favorable terms).
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plaintiff appealed, arguing that the refusal to order a sale was in error. 101
The appellate court reversed, stating that:
When a judgment creditor seeks a charging order and the trial court
enters the charging order, we do not read the [UPA]'02 to provide
the trial court with the discretion to deny an order for sale in
absence of proof that the debt will be satisfied from the debtor
partner's share of the profits in a reasonable period of time.
Additionally, we do not read the [UPA] to vest a trial court with
the discretion to deny an order for sale on the speculative grounds
identified here. A judgment creditor should not have to await
suppositional development of the partnership property before it
collects on its judgment. To hold otherwise would countervail the
logic of the [UPA] which we have noted protects the remaining
partners from an involuntary dissolution by allowing them to
redeem the debtor-partner's interest after sale is ordered. 103
Although the above language does not expressly address the matters of
consent or undue interference, the philosophy expressed by the court is
unmistakable. The only limitation on foreclosure recognized by the court
is the requirement that the creditor must prove that there is insufficient
income to pay off the judgment without sale of the interest. By necessary
implication the court rejects any inquiry into consent or undue interference
with the partnership business.
C. The Georgia Statute
A statute in Georgia speaks directly to the issue of foreclosure and sale
of a partnership interest in order to satisfy a personal claim against a
partner.10 4 The position of the Georgia statute is unique and calls
attention to the policies underlying the above discussion. Thus, it is
appropriate to treat it briefly at this stage.
101. FDIC v. Birchwood Builders, Inc., 573 A.2d 182, 183 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
102. The UPA was described by the court as "U.P.L." (meaning Uniform Partnership Law). The
description in the text has been conformed to the usage in the remainder of the text for ease of reading.
103. FDIC, 573 A.2d at 186.
104. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-28 (1989).
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Georgia is the most recent state to have adopted UPA. °5 It made a
number of amendments to the Uniform Act, including amending UPA
section 28 to state that an interest charged under the Act "is not liable to
be seized and sold by the judgment creditor under execution."' 6 A brief
explanation for this reversal of the Uniform Act was made by Professor
Larry E. Ribstein, the principal draftsman of the Georgia amendments. In
his article entitled, An Analysis of Georgia's New Partnership Law,10 7
Professor Ribstein states that the new section 28 "does not provide for
foreclosure, 10 8 a procedure that could not be controlled by the partners
and that might permit unwanted outsiders to compel dissolution of the
firm."'
109
How one reacts to this depends on how one views creditors' rights
versus the rights of partners to operate their business without interference.
Viewed from the perspective of creditors, one can argue that it is
inaccurate to say that the procedure cannot be controlled by the partners.
Partners have substantial powers of control in their redemption rights.
Also, a partnership agreement can anticipate dissolution and define
liquidation rights, establish means of evaluating partnership interests,
provide for payout periods to avoid liquidity problems, provide for
continuation of the business by a vote of the remaining partners, and so
forth. Planning ahead for dissolution is particularly advisable for
partnerships at will, where the purchaser's dissolution right is most
intrusive.
The intrusive effect of foreclosure and sale disappears when the
redemption right is exercised by the other partners. Even when the
redemption right is not exercised, the negative effect of foreclosure can be
minimized for most partnerships by intelligent planning for dissolution.
Because of this, it can be argued that the Georgia approach takes too little
note of the legitimate interest of the unpaid creditor.
105. See 6 U.L.A. at I (Supp. 1993) (stating that Georgia adopted UPA in 1985).
106. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-28 (1989).
107. Larry E. Ribstein, An Analysis of Georgia's New Partnership Law, 36 MERCER L. REV. 443 (1985).
108. There is a difference between a foreclosure sale and an execution sale. See supra note 73. The
difference was addressed by the court in the Hellman case, in a portion of the opinion not relevant to this article.
See supra note 66. The Georgia statute prohibits execution, not foreclosure. It is likely, however, that the
Georgia statute will be interpreted in the way Professor Ribstein construes it.
109. Ribstein, supra note 107, at 490.
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D. The Uniform Partnership Act (1992)
UPA was recently substantially revised by a drafting committee for the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL)." ° The revised version was adopted by NCCUSL in
1992."' It is identified as the Uniform Partnership Act 1992, but for the
convenience of those familiar with its drafting history, it will be referred
to as the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1992) ("RUPA").
The charging order continues to be recognized in RUPA. Section
504(b) of RUPA is the provision setting forth the charging order
process. 2 In it the remedy of foreclosure and sale of a partnership
interest is expressly and directly recognized.' 13  In terms of proposed
uniform legislation, therefore, that remedy has recently been reaffirmed." 4
110. See generally J. Dennis Hynes, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Some Comments on the Latest
Draft of RUPA, 19 RA. ST. L. REV. 727 (1992).
111. See 6 U.L.A. 214 (Supp. 1993).
112. See REV. UNIw. PARTNEHIP Acr § 504(b), 6 U.L.A. 231 (Supp. 1993); infra note 113 (providing
the full text of § 504).
113. RUPA § 504 reads in full as follows:
Section 504. Partner's Transferable Interest Subject To Charging Order.
(a) On application by a judgment creditor of a partner or partner's transferee, a court having
jurisdiction may charge the transferable interest of the debtor partner or transferee to satisfy the
judgment. The court may appoint a receiver of the debtor's share of the distributions due or to
become due to the debtor in respect of the partnership and make all other orders, directions, accounts,
and inquiries the debtor might have made or which the circumstances of the case may require.
(b) A charging order constitutes a lien on the judgment debtor's transferable interest in the
partnership. The court may order a foreclosure of the interest subject to the charging order at any
time and upon conditions it considers appropriate. The purchaser at the foreclosure sale has the rights
of a transferee.
(c) At any time before foreclosure, an interest charged may be redeemed:
(1) by the judgment debtor,
(2) with property other than partnership property, by one or more of the other partners; or
(3) with partnership property, by one or more of the other partners with the consent of all of
the partners whose interests are not so charged.
(d) This [Act] does not deprive a partner of a right under exemption laws with respect to the partner's
interest in the partnership.
(e) This section provides the exclusive remedy by which ajudgment creditor of a partner or partner's
transferee may satisfy ajudgment out of the judgment debtor's transferable interest in the partnership.
UNIw. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 504, 6 U.L.A. 230-31 (Supp. 1993).
114. There are several features about § 504 of RUPA that seem worth a brief comment. First, the wording
"transferable interest" in both the title and the text of § 504 is a little odd. It seems to imply that a
nontransferable interest can exist and that it can be created by language in the partnership agreement prohibiting
transfer of a partner's interest. That is not what is meant, however. Instead, the drafters of RUPA have chosen
this route to make the point that a partner's interest in specific partnership property is not transferable, as
specified in § 501 of RUPA. Thus, in this somewhat complicated way, the drafters of RUPA are simply
expressing the same concept that existed in UPA with regard to protection of specific partnership property from
the actions of individual partners or the claims of creditors of individual partners.
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CONCLUSION
As mentioned at the outset, the Crocker and Hellman cases raise new
and intriguing issues about the scope of the charging order, forcing the
reader to reconsider the history and policy behind this unique device. In
each instance, however, the approach of the California courts seems
inadvisable. Both Crocker and Hellman introduce vagueness and
uncertainty into an area of law where this seems unnecessary to advance
the interests of justice. The opinions exaggerate the difficulties faced by
the nondebtor partners who have protective devices available to them
within the statute itself, and treat too lightly the interests of creditors. By
doing this, the decisions risk creating de facto and undisclosed exemption
of partnership interests. Considering the redemption powers granted
nondebtor partners by the statute and the limited nature of the interest
being sold, it seems clear that the interests of creditors and nondebtor
partners are adequately balanced without the added restrictions imposed by
the Crocker and Hellman cases.
Also, the remedy of dissolution which is available to a purchaser under § 32(2) of UPA is no longer so
clearly defined. See supra note 34 (providing the relevant text of UPA § 32). In § 801 of RUPA, entitled
"Events Causing Dissolution And Winding Up Of Partnership Business," it is stated that:
A partnership is dissolved, and its business must be wound up, only upon:...
(6) on application by a transferee of a partner's transferable interest, a judicial determination
that it is equitable to wind up the partnership business:
(i) if the partnership was for a definite term or particular undertaking at the time of the
transfer or entry of the charging order that gave rise to transfer, after the expiration of the
term or completion of the undertaking; or
(ii) if the partnership was a partnership at will at the time of the transfer or entry of the
charging order that gave rise to the transfer, at any time.
REv. UNW. PARmNEtsmP ACt § 801, 6 U.L.A. 236-37 (Supp. 1993).
Dissolution is available on demand by a purchaser of a partner's interest under UPA if the partnership is
at will. See supra note 34. Under RUPA, it is subject to a determination that it "is equitable" to wind up the
business. REV. UNW. PARTNmEnsip AcT § 801(6), 6 U.L.A. 327 (Supp. 1993). It is important not to confuse this
discretionary standard with that imposed for decreeing sale of an interest. This standard applies after an interest
has been purchased. Id It thus seems to represent a change in the law. The latest edition available of the
comments to § 801, however, state that, "[s]ection 801(6) continues with only minor modification the rule in
UPA § 32(2)." UNIF. PARTNERSmiP AcT (1992), reprinted in BROMBERO & RIBSmN, supra note 17, at 246
(Supp. 1992) (providing comments to UPA § 801). It is questionable whether the difference between the words
"the court shall decree" (UPA) and "determine that it is equitable" (RUPA) is indeed only a "minor"
modification. RUPA is substituting a vague standard for a precise and clear one. The merits of doing so are not
altogether clear.
